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NOTE
Constitutional Law/Access to Courts-LIMITING THE RELIEF
AVAILABLE TO INDIGENT DEATH Row INMATES DENIED MEANINGFUL
ACCESS TO THE COURTS: Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989)
SCOTT ELLIOTT ROGERS
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."I
T HIS Note examines a prisoner's constitutional right of meaningful
access to the courts, focusing on the relief available to a death
row inmate denied meaningful access to a state court to obtain a writ
of habeas corpus. In Murray v. Giarratano,2 the United States Su-
preme Court held that a federal district court cannot remedy such a
constitutional violation by ordering the state to appoint counsel for
the inmate. This Note traces the development of the body of law rec-
ognizing that the fourteenth amendment prohibits governmental re-
strictions which act to deny indigents the right to seek relief in the
courts. The Note analyzes the Giarratano decision and discusses its
impact on meaningful access jurisprudence, concluding that the deci-
sion is supported by neither precedent nor policy.
I. MEANINGFUL ACCESS BEFORE GLARRATANO
Notice and hearing are basic elements of the constitutional require-
ment of due process of law.' The necessity of due notice and an op-
portunity to be heard are "immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government." '4 At issue in Giarratano
was this fourteenth amendment right to be heard by the courts-a ju-
risprudence encompassing both "right-to-counsel" and "access-to-
1. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
4. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898).
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courts" cases.' All of these cases "share a concern, based upon the
Fourteenth Amendment, that accused and convicted persons be per-
mitted to seek legal remedies without arbitrary governmental interfer-
ence." ' 6 As noted by Justice Stevens in Giarratano, "the fountainhead
of this body of law is Powell v. Alabama."'
In Powell v. Alabama,' seven men were accused of rape. 9 The
United States Supreme Court noted that "until the very morning of
the trial no lawyer had been named or definitely designated to repre-
sent the defendants."' 0 Finding that the "right to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel,"'I the Court reversed the convictions and death sen-
tences of all seven defendants. 12
The Court recognized that "[e]ven the intelligent and educated lay-
man has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."' 3 Thus, a
criminal defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him.' ' 4 The Court held that counsel must
be appointed in a capital case "as a necessary requisite of due process
of law" and that the appointment must not be made "at such a time
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid
in the preparation and trial of the case."'" The Court stated its ration-
ale in strong language: "In a case such as this, whatever may be the
rule in other cases, the right to have counsel appointed, when neces-
sary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by
counsel. '16
A. The Development of the Meaningful Access Doctrine
Following Powell, the Court developed the doctrine of meaningful
access through its consideration of four types of cases, involving the
requirement of "filing fees," the right to counsel, the right of access
to courts and the right to effective assistance of counsel. An examina-
tion of these cases reveals the origins and extent of the meaningful
5. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Id. at 49. The Court described the seven defendants as "youthful, . . . ignorant and
illiterate." Id. at 52.
10. Id. at 56.
11. Id. at 68-69.
12. Id. at 73.
13. Id. at 69.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 71.
16. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
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access doctrine and provides the analytical framework for a discussion
Giarratano.
1. The "Filing Fees" Cases
In Griffin v. Illinois,7 the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether states could administer their criminal appellate systems, con-
sistent with the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment, "so as to deny adequate appellate review to the
poor while granting such review to all others."'" Illinois law provided
that in all criminal cases a defendant would have a nondiscretionary
right of appeal. 19 Illinois law also required a defendant to furnish the
appellate court with either a bill of exceptions or a report of the trial
proceedings "in order to get full direct appellate review." 20 Except for
indigent defendants sentenced to death, all defendants, whether indi-
gent or not, had to purchase the court records. 21 The petitioners in
Griffin, two indigents convicted of armed robbery, were unable to ac-
quire copies of the transcript and court records because they could not
afford the fees charged to obtain them. 22 The trial court denied the
petitioners' motion asking that a certified copy of the entire record be
provided to them without cost. 23
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' rights under both the
due process and equal protection clauses had been violated. In the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Black wrote that "our own constitutional guar-
anties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in
criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between per-
sons and different groups of persons." ' 24 The Court then extended this
rationale to the appellate stage of the criminal process: "There is no
meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the
right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively
denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have
money enough to pay the costs in advance. '25 When a state grants
17. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id.
20. Id. Indigents could obtain a "mandatory record" free of charge. A "mandatory rec-
ord" consisted of the indictment, arraignment, plea, verdict and sentence. Review was then lim-
ited to errors on the face of the record. There could be no review of trial errors unless the
defendant purchased a certified copy of the entire record. Id. at 13 n.2.
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 18.
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appellate review as of right, 26 it must do so in a way that does not
discriminate "against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty." ' 27 Thus, the Court held that these indigent defendants were
entitled to free transcripts. 28
The Court based its reasoning on the importance of appellate re-
view:
[T]o deny adequate review to the poor means that many of them may
lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions
which appellate courts would set aside .... Such a denial is misfit in
a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to
buy transcripts .29
Griffin was reinforced three years later in Burns v. Ohio.3° In
Burns, the petitioner was convicted of burglary and his conviction was
upheld by the Ohio Court of Appeals. He then attempted to file a
motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attached to
his motion was an affidavit stating that he was indigent and unable to
pay the required filing fee.31 The Clerk of the Court refused to file the
papers because the fee was not included. The Clerk returned the pa-
pers to Burns and included with them a letter in which he wrote that
"the Supreme Court has determined on numerous occasions that the
docket fee . . . takes precedence over any other statute which may
allow a pauper's affidavit to be filed in lieu of a docket fee. For that
reason we cannot honor your request." 32
Relying upon its decision in Griffin, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that Ohio had violated Burns' rights under the fourteenth
26. A state is not required by the United States Constitution to provide a right to appellate
review. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) (New York not required to provide a
right to bail pending appeal because appellate review is not "a necessary element of due process
of law").
27. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
28. Id. at 19. Although the petitioners were entitled to a free transcript, the Court limited
its holding: "We do not hold ... that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every
case where a defendant cannot buy it. The [Illinois] Supreme Court may find other means of
affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants." Id. at 20. Thus, the
states were left to choose the method by which they would comply with the constitutional re-
quirement of nondiscriminatory appellate review.
29. Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
30. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
31. Id. at 253.
32. Id. at 254.
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amendment by requiring that he pay a fee in order to file an appeal in
the state supreme court.33 The Court rejected several arguments ad-
vanced by Ohio. First, Ohio argued that Burns had already received
one appellate review of his conviction and therefore the state had sat-
isfied its obligations under Griffin. The Court responded that Ohio
had failed to comprehend the full import of Griffin:
Griffin holds [that] once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty. This
principle is no less applicable where the State has afforded an
indigent defendant access to the first phase of its appellate procedure
but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency.34
Ohio next argued that the appellate review at issue in Griffin was a
matter of right, while leave to appeal to Ohio's Supreme Court was
discretionary. The Court rejected this argument as well. Finding that
nonindigent defendants would be afforded the opportunity to have
the state supreme court consider the merits of their applications for
leave to appeal while indigents were denied that opportunity, the
Court held that indigents must "have the same opportunities to in-
voke the discretion of the Supreme Court of Ohio."" In vacating the
judgment below, the Court stated that "[tihe imposition by the State
of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for
indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal
Justice Under Law." 36
The "right of access" enumerated in Griffin and Burns was further
refined in Smith v. Bennett,37 where the Supreme Court held that fil-
ing fees could not be imposed upon indigent defendants seeking relief
in state habeas corpus proceedings.3" Iowa had established a procedure
allowing criminal defendants to apply for a writ of habeas corpus in
its state courts. However, before applying for the writ or the allow-
ance of an appeal in such a proceeding, defendants were required to
pay a four-dollar filing fee.39 The petitioners in Bennett could not af-
ford the fee and their petitions were therefore not docketed in the dis-
33. Id. at 257-58.
34. Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 258.
36. Id.
37. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
38. Id. at 709.
39. Id. at 708.
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trict courts. 40 In fact, Iowa conceded that "indigent convicted
criminals are unable to file a petition for habeas corpus in Iowa."''4
The Supreme Court held that this procedure violated the fourteenth
amendment because "to interpose any financial consideration between
an indigent prisoner of the state and his exercise of a state right to sue
for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the
laws.' '42
Iowa attempted to distinguish the habeas corpus proceeding from a
criminal appellate proceeding. The state noted that Griffin and Burns
concerned the rights of a defendant seeking to make a direct attack
upon a conviction by appeal. "Habeas corpus, on the other hand, is
not an attack on the conviction but on the validity of the detention
and is, therefore, a collateral proceeding. ' 43 Given Iowa's concession
that the writ of habeas corpus was an available postconviction civil
remedy, the question presented to the Court was clear: "Since Iowa
does make the writ available to prisoners who have the $4 fee, may it
constitutionally preclude its use by those who do not?"' A
The Court determined that exempting indigents from paying the fee
would not necessarily lead to like exceptions for all habeas corpus
proceedings. The Court also found irrelevant the fact that habeas cor-
pus, as a statutory right, could be legislatively limited. 45 Finally, the
Court took strong exception to Iowa's claim that indigents could be
afforded federal habeas corpus relief under Iowa's fee structure. Iowa
argued that its fee requirement satisfied the demand of the federal ha-
beas corpus statute that in order for a state prisoner to bring a federal
petition, circumstances must exist which render state corrective proce-
dures ineffective to protect the prisoner's rights. 46 The Court re-
sponded that "it would ill-behoove this great State, whose devotion to
the equality of rights is indelibly stamped upon its history, to say to its
indigent prisoners seeking to redress what they believe to be the
State's wrongs: 'Go to the federal court."' 4 7
The Court found no distinction between the filing fees for writs of
habeas corpus in Bennett and those fees at issue in Griffin and
Burns .4  Iowa established a procedure through which convicted
40. Id. at 709-10. The Supreme Court of Iowa denied the application as well. Id.




45. Id. at 713.
46. Id. at 711.
47. Id. at 713.
48. Id. at 710-11.
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defendants could petition for a writ of habeas corpus and attempt to
overturn their convictions. The procedure, however, was "available
only to those persons who [could] pay the necessary filing fees." '4 9
This restriction violated an indigent prisoner's rights under the four-
teenth amendment.50
Griffin, Burns and Bennett established that indigent criminal
defendants are no longer subject to filing fees which would effectively
foreclose their right of access to appellate procedures. This right of
access extends not only to a first appeal as of right, but also to discre-
tionary appeals and civil postconviction collateral proceedings.
2. The Right to Counsel
On March 18, 1963, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment guarantees indigents the appointment of counsel in state
trial courts,5 as well as in their first appeal as of right.5 2 In one day,
the Court resolved what it described as "a continuing source of con-
troversy and litigation in both state and federal courts": a defendant's
federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court. 3
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,5 4 a
state court had no duty to assign counsel to indigent defendants ab-
sent "special circumstances." 55 In Gideon, the Court explicitly recog-
49. Id. at 713-14.
50. Id. at 714.
51. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
52. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
53. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338. On the same day that the Court decided Gideon and Douglas,
the Court also decided Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). In Brown, the Court held that
Indiana had deprived an indigent defendant "of a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
by refusing him appellate review of the denial of a writ of error coram nobis solely because of
his poverty." Id. at 478. Under Indiana law, only a public defender could obtain a free tran-
script of a coram nobis hearing for an indigent defendant. Id. at 481. Relying upon Griffin,
Burns and Bennett, the Court found this provision of Indiana's public defender system to be
constitutionally impermissible because "a person with sufficient funds [could] appeal as of right
to the Supreme Court of Indiana from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis, but an indigent
[could], at the will of the Public Defender, be entirely cut off from any appeal at all." Brown,
357 U.S. at 481.
In addition to Griffin, Burns and Bennett, the Brown Court found support for its decision in
Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958). In Eskridge, the Court held consti-
tutionally invalid a procedure that authorized a judge to give an indigent defendant a free tran-
script, but only if the judge determined that justice would be promoted by doing so. Id. at 215-
16; see also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (holding a procedure unconstitutional
that authorized judges to provide a free transcript to indigent defendants only if appeal was not
frivolous).
54. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
55. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Betts, the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment does not "embod[y] an inexorable command" that counsel be appointed for every
indigent defendant. Id at 473. Whether due process is denied by the refusal to appoint counsel in
a particular case must be "tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts" in that case. Id. at 462.
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nized that "appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal
defendant was 'a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial."' 5 6 Thus,
the right to counsel, a "fundamental safeguard[] of liberty," is pro-
tected by the due process clause and cannot be abridged by the state.17
To support this conclusion, the Court noted the important role of de-
fense counsel in a criminal trial:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious
truth .... [L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours. 58
Gideon dealt only with the right to counsel at trial. In Douglas v.
California,9 the issue was "whether or not an indigent shall be denied
the assistance of counsel on appeal." 6 The two petitioners in Douglas
were jointly tried and convicted of thirteen felonies. 6 ' They both ap-
pealed as of right. They "requested, and were denied, the assistance
of counsel on appeal, even though it plainly appeared they were indi-
gents." ' 62 The Supreme Court held that the indigent defendants were
denied equal protection of the laws. 63 The Court stated that "where
the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are
decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line
has been drawn between rich and poor." 64 The Court observed that a
defendant falling on the wrong side of that line received grossly un-
equal treatment in the appellate system:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the
benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law,
and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent,
already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is
without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the
56. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 471).
57. Id. at 341. The Court had previously held that federal courts must provide counsel to
indigent criminal defendants. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
58. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
59. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
60. Id. at 355.
61. Id. at 353.
62. Id. at 354.
63. Id. at 355.
64. Id. at 357 (emphasis in original).
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record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a
meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal. 6
No longer would the indigent charged with a crime have to "face his
accusers without a lawyer to assist him,"6 either at trial or on appeal
as of right.
3. The Right of Access to the Courts
In February 1965, William Joe Johnson, an inmate at the Tennessee
State Penitentiary, was confined to the maximum security building be-
cause he assisted other inmates in the preparation of habeas corpus
petitions, 67 a practice forbidden under a prison regulation. 68 Johnson
filed a "motion for law books and a typewriter" in federal district
court, which treated the motion as a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. 69 The district court "held that the regulation was void because it
in effect barred illiterate prisoners from access to federal habeas cor-
pus." 70
In Johnson v. Avery, 71 the Supreme Court upheld the district
court's determination. The Court began its analysis by noting that it
had "constantly emphasized the fundamental importance of the writ
of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme," ' 72 and that the Court
had "steadfastly insisted that 'there is no higher duty than to maintain
it unimpaired. ' ' 73 Thus, the Court concluded that it is "fundamental
that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting
their complaints may not be denied or obstructed.' 74
65. Id. at 357-58. The Court limited the extent of its consideration to the right to counsel
for a first appeal as of right and stated explicitly that it was not deciding whether there was a
right to counsel for a discretionary appeal. See id. at 356.
66. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
67. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 484 (1969).
68. The regulation provided the following:
No inmate will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid another, either with or with-
out a fee, to prepare Writs or other legal matters. It is not intended that an innocent
man be punished. When a man believes he is unlawfully held or illegally convicted, he
should prepare a brief or state his complaint in letter form and address it to his lawyer
or a judge. A formal Writ is not necessary to receive a hearing. False charges or un-
true complaints may be punished. Inmates are forbidden to set themselves up as prac-
titioners for the purpose of promoting a business of writing Writs.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), rev'd, 382 F.2d 353
(6th Cir. 1967)).
71. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
72. Id. at 485.
73. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939)).
74. Id.
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Tennessee did not provide inmates with any means of assistance
with which to prepare habeas corpus petitions.7 Therefore, by forbid-
ding inmates from assisting other inmates, Tennessee had effectively
deprived some of its prisoners access to federal habeas corpus relief
altogether, thus denying them a fundamental right of access to the
courts.7 6 The Court held that "unless and until the State provides
some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of pe-
titions for post-conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regula-
tion such as that here in issue. ' '77
Following Johnson, the Supreme Court in Younger v. Gilmore,78 in
a two-paragraph per curiam opinion, affirmed a district court judg-
ment which required that indigent prisoners be provided with access to
reasonably adequate law libraries in order to prepare legal papers. 79
As explained in a later decision, the Court in Younger held that the
Constitution mandated that states "protect the right of prisoners to
access to the courts by providing them with law libraries or alternative
sources of legal knowledge." 80
The constitutional right of access to the courts was further refined
in two 1974 Supreme Court cases. In Procunier v. Martinez,8' the
Court enjoined enforcement of a regulation prohibiting the use of law
students and paralegals to conduct attorney-client interviews with in-
mates.82 The district court had held that this rule inhibited adequate
legal representation of indigent defendants.8 3 Accepting the trial
court's factual conclusions, the Supreme Court stated that its decision
was "mandated" by its previous determination in Johnson.14 The
Court found no justification for banning the use of law students and
paralegals:
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a corollary
the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in
order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for
violations of their constitutional rights. This means that inmates
must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance
75. Id. at 488.
76. Id. at 489.
77. Id. at 490.
78. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
79. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
80. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 817 (1977).
81. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
82. Id. at 419.
83. Id. at 420.
84. Id. at 421.
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of attorneys. Regulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct
the availability of professional representation or other aspects of the
right of access to the courts are invalid.8 5
The right of access recognized in Johnson was further extended in
Wolff v. McDonnell.16 In Wolff, the Court was confronted with a
prison regulation similar to that in Johnson.17 The Court was asked
whether the legal assistance mandated for habeas corpus petitions in
Johnson was also required for civil rights actions. In a unanimous
opinion, the Court found "no reasonable distinction between the two
forms of actions" and extended the right of access to civil rights ac-
tions.8
The Court rejected the "narrow" view that Johnson was limited to
assistance in the preparation of habeas corpus petitions. 9 Noting that
"the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas peti-
tions" lacked clarity, the Court found compelling the fact that "both
actions serve to protect basic constitutional rights." 9 The Court ex-
plained that "[tihe right of access to the courts, upon which Johnson
was premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that
no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary
allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional
rights.'"91
States must provide legal assistance to indigent inmates to help
them prepare habeas corpus petitions and civil rights complaints. If a
state does not provide some form of alternative assistance, a regula-
tion prohibiting inmates from providing legal assistance to other in-
mates violates the constitutional right of access to the courts.
4. Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Gideon v. Wainright,92 the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that indigent de-
fendants facing felony charges be provided with a lawyer at the state's
85. Id. at 419.
86. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
87. The regulation in Wolff stated that the warden had appointed an inmate as "legal advi-
sor . . . for the benefit of those offenders who are in need of legal assistance .... No other
offender than the legal advisor is permitted to assist [inmates] in the preparation of legal docu-
ments unless with the specific written permission of the Warden." Id. at 577-78.
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id. at 579.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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expense. 93 In Douglas v. California,94 the Court held that indigent de-
fendants are also guaranteed the right to counsel for their first appeal
as of right. 95 Gideon and Douglas have both been construed to guar-
antee not only the right to the assistance of counsel, but also the right
to effective assistance of counsel.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,96 the Court held that inadequate assistance of
counsel during trial could provide the basis for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. The Court held that "inadequate assistance does not satisfy" the
right to counsel enunciated in Gideon.97 Reasoning that unless counsel
is "able to invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that dis-
tinguish our system of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the
trial itself." '98 The Court held that the "right to counsel prevents the
States from conducting trials at which persons who face incarceration
must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance."99
The Court extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to a
defendant's first appeal as of right in Evitts v. Lucey.0 ° The Court
stated that "[a] first appeal as of right . . . is not adjudicated in ac-
cord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effec-
tive assistance of an attorney."'' ° The Court also noted that "the
promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a
right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it compre-
hended the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' ' 0 2 Finding
support in both the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, 03 the Court held that the appellate level right
to counsel comprehends that counsel will be effective.'°'
93. Id. at 344.
94. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
95. Id. at 357.
96. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
97. Id. at 344.
98. Id. at 343.
99. Id. at 344.
100. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
101. Id. at 396 (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 397.
103. Id. at 405. The Court emphatically rejected the argument advanced by the petitioners
that the constitutional requirement recognized in Griffin and Douglas found its source in the
equal protection clause and not the due process clause. See id.
104. Id. at 397. Justice Rehnquist, joined only by Chief Justice Burger, dissented in Lucey.
While he found that there was "no question that an attorney is of substantial, if not critical,
assistance on appeal," Justice Rehnquist nevertheless disagreed with the holding that the Doug-
las appellate level right to counsel comprehended effective assistance. Id. at 409 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). He feared that the Court's decision would allow "lawfully convicted criminals with
no meritorious bases for attacking the conduct of their trials ... to tie up the courts with habeas
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Finally, in Anders v. California,05 the Court further refined the
Douglas right to appellate counsel, holding that once a court appoints
counsel for an appeal as of right, the attorney may withdraw only
after adhering to certain procedures. Pursuant to Anders, if a court-
appointed attorney determines that an indigent defendant's appeal is
meritless, that attorney must request permission from the court to
withdraw. 1°6 The court then reviews the record and determines
whether the appeal has any merit. If any arguable legal issue exists,
the court must appoint another lawyer to represent the indigent de-
fendant. 0 7 Anders assures that the right to appellate counsel, set forth
in Douglas, is not a meaningless gesture.
B. Confining the Right to Counsel
As the Court expanded the meaningful access doctrine, it also cur-
tailed perhaps the most important element of the doctrine: the right to
counsel. In Ross v. Moffitt, 108 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
extending the rule developed in Douglas to discretionary appeals. The
Court held that indigent defendants are not entitled to appointed
counsel when seeking a discretionary appeal to a state's highest court
or when seeking to petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court.'°9
Ross involved North Carolina's refusal to appoint counsel for the
respondent, an indigent defendant, in two separate cases."10 In the
first case, the respondent requested the appointment of counsel to as-
sist him in seeking discretionary review in the North Carolina Su-
preme Court."' In the second case, the respondent requested the
appointment of counsel to assist him in the preparation of a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court." 2 The
respondent argued that Douglas required North Carolina to appoint
petitions alleging defective performance of appellate counsel." Id. at 411. Justice Rehnquist
would limit the right to appellate counsel to just that-counsel-without regard to effectiveness,
and leave the "criminal defendant who has been badly served by the lawyer whom he hired to
represent him" to suffer "the consequences of [his] attorneyl's] neglect or malpractice." Id.
105. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
106. Id. at 744. The request must be accompanied by a brief "referring to anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal." Id. The defendant must be furnished a copy of
the brief and given time to raise any arguments the defendant chooses. Id.
107. Id.
108. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
109. Id. at 619.
110. Id. at 603.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 604.
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counsel in both cases.' 3 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, disagreed.
The Court began its analysis by articulating the constitutional ra-
tionale for the Griffin/Douglas line of cases. Finding support in both
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court distinguished the two: 'Due process' emphasizes
fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State,
regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in
treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations
are arguably indistinguishable." 1" 4 Neither clause, according to the
Court, supports the right to counsel for a discretionary appeal.
The Court held that the due process clause did not require North
Carolina to provide indigent defendants with an attorney for a discre-
tionary appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court." 5 The Court
found significant the differences "between the trial and appellate
stages of a criminal proceeding.""16 The Court observed that while the
state has an aggressive role at trial, its role on appeal is different:
By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who
initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of
the State's prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made
by a judge or a jury below. The defendant needs an attorney on
appeal not as a shield to protect him against being "haled into
court" by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence,
but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt....
The fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically
mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to
indigent defendants at every stage of the way." 7
Because unfairness would result only if indigents were denied access to
the courts based upon their poverty, the Court considered the issue to
be an equal protection question." 8
113. Id. at 607.
114. Id. at 609.
115. Id. at 610.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 610-11 (emphasis in original). The Court inexplicably cited Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963), to support this proposition. In Douglas, the Court held that a state acts
unconstitutionally when it does not provide counsel to an indigent defendant for a first appeal as
of right. Id. at 355. The Fourth Circuit found "no logical basis for differentiation between
appeals of right and permissive review procedures in the context of the Constitution and the
right to counsel." Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
The Supreme Court majority did not fully explain why the Douglas rationale did not apply with
equal force where the appeal is discretionary. For a discussion of Douglas, see supra text accom-
panying notes 59-65.
118. Ross, 417 U.S. at 611.
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While the Court found no equal protection violation, it nevertheless
recognized the link between the right to counsel and a defendant's
right of meaningful access to the courts: "We do not believe that it
can be said ... that a defendant in respondent's circumstances is de-
nied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply
because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking re-
view in that court.""19 The Court found further support for its conclu-
sion in its observation that the "Critical issue" before the state
supreme court was not whether there had been "a correct adjudica-
tion of guilt.' 120
Admitting that an indigent defendant would be "somewhat handi-
capped in comparison with a wealthy defendant who has counsel as-
sisting him in every conceivable manner at every stage in the
proceeding," the Court nevertheless found no equal protection viola-
tion.' 2 ' Even though the Court recognized that North Carolina dis-
criminated against impoverished defendants, the discrimination was,
apparently, not so invidious as to invoke the protection of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the Court concluded that states need only
"assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his
claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process."' 2  Thus,
a criminal defendant has no automatic right to counsel in seeking a
discretionary state appeal or in petitioning the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. 123
In Pennsylvania v. Finley,124 the Court held that indigent prisoners
also have no right to counsel when seeking postconviction relief in a
state court. The respondent had been appointed counsel, pursuant to
state law, for her state postconviction proceedings. The appointed at-
119. Id. at 615. The Court observed that when seeking discretionary review, a defendant
would have a transcript or record of the trial, an appellate brief, and often an appellate decision.
Thus, the Court believed an indigent defendant would be able to provide the state supreme court
with an adequate basis to grant or deny review. Id.
120. Id. Thus, the Court distinguished Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), which con-
cerned a nondiscretionary right to full appellate review of the correctness of the trial court's
judgment. For a discussion of Griffin, see supra text accompanying notes 17-29.
121. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). The "relative handicap" of the indigent
defendant in Ross was, according to the Court, "far less than the handicap borne by the indigent
defendant denied counsel on his initial appeal as of right in Douglas." Id.
122. Id.
123. Relying on Ross, the Court in Wainright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982), held that since
defendants have no right to counsel for a discretionary state appeal, they have no constitutional
claim if their retained counsel is ineffective in that appeal. Id. at 587-88. Therefore, ineffective
assistance of counsel in a discretionary state appeal will not support a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The Fourth Circuit has also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of state
habeas counsel as a basis for a federal habeas corpus petition. See Whitley v. Muncy, 823 F.2d
55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1034 (1987).
124. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
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torney sought to withdraw after concluding that there were no argua-
ble bases for collateral relief. Agreeing that there were no arguable
issues, the trial court dismissed the petition. 25 This dismissal was re-
versed on appeal after the respondent acquired another appointed at-
torney. The state appellate court determined that Pennsylvania law
concerning procedures to be followed when appointed counsel finds
no basis for an appeal is derived from Anders v. California.26 The
court found that the respondent's appointed attorney had failed to
follow the Anders procedures and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. 2 7
The Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require that
the Anders procedures be followed if appointed counsel decides to
withdraw from state habeas proceedings. 28 Since "Anders established
a prophylactic framework that is relevant when, and only when, a liti-
gant has a previously established constitutional right to counsel,"'' 29
the Court needed initially to determine whether indigent prisoners
have a right to counsel when seeking state habeas relief. Relying on
Ross, the Court reasoned that "since a defendant has no federal con-
stitutional right to counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on
direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no such right when
attacking a conviction that has long since become final upon exhaus-
tion of the appellate process."' 30 Thus, if a state chooses to provide an
avenue for collateral attack of a criminal conviction, "the fundamen-
tal fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that
the State supply a lawyer as well."''
Right-to-counsel jurisprudence is clearly defined. Both the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
guarantee an indigent defendant the assistance of effective counsel
during the criminal trial and the first appeal as of right. Neither the
due process clause nor the equal protection clause, however, automat-
ically requires states to supply an attorney upon request when an indi-
gent defendant seeks discretionary review in a state's highest court,
petitions the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, or seeks postcon-
viction relief in a state habeas corpus proceeding.
125. Id. at 553.
126. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For a short discussion of Anders, see supra text accompanying
notes 105-07.
127. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553-54.
128. Id. at 557.
129. Id. at 555.
130. Id. The Court explained that "[p]ostconviction relief is even further removed from the
criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself,
and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature." Id. at 556-57.
131. Id. at 557.
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C. Bounds v. Smith and Meaningful Access
The seminal case involving a prisoner's right of access to the courts
is Bounds v. Smith.' Inmates from various penal institutions
throughout North Carolina alleged that the state failed to provide le-
gal research facilities, thereby depriving them of access to the courts
in violation of the fourteenth amendment.'33 The district court found
that "the sole prison library in the State was 'severely inadequate' and
that there was no other legal assistance available to inmates.' ' 3 4 The
court ruled that the state had denied the inmates access to the courts
and "left to the State the choice of what alternative would 'most eas-
ily and economically' fulfill" the constitutional duty to provide its
prisoners access to the courts.'35
The Supreme Court began its consideration by declaring that "[it is
now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional
right of access to the courts."'13 6 Tracing the history of its "access to
the courts" jurisprudence, the Court "reaffirmed that States must 'as-
sure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his
claims fairly." ' 13 7 Minimal access is not enough. "'[Mleaningful ac-
cess' to the courts is the touchstone.' ' 38
To achieve that goal, states have "affirmative obligations to assure
all prisoners meaningful access to the courts."13 9 The Court held that
"the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law li-
braries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 140
Two aspects of Bounds deserve closer inspection. First, the right of
meaningful access to the courts is not as limited in its scope as is the
right to counsel. The Bounds Court specifically held that habeas cor-
132. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
133. Id. at 818.
134. Id. (quoting district court).
135. Id. at 819 (quoting district court). North Carolina offered to establish seven libraries
throughout the state. The state also proposed to train inmates as research assistants and typists
to assist other inmates. Under North Carolina's proposal, approximately 350 inmates could use
the libraries. The state did not offer to provide independent legal advisors for the inmates. The
district court held that the state's plan satisfied its constitutional obligation to provide prisoners
access to the courts. Id. at 819-21.
136. Id. at 821.
137. Id. at 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974)).
138. Id. (quoting Ross, 417 U.S. at 611).
139. Id. at 824.
140. Id. at 828. The Court added that the holding "is, of course, a reaffirmation of the
result reached in Younger v. Gilmore[, 404 U.S. 15 (1971)]." Id. For a short discussion of
Younger, see supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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pus proceedings and civil rights actions "are encompassed by the right
of access.''4' Thus, although no right to counsel may exist for an in-
digent seeking postconviction relief, the right of meaningful access to
the courts requires states to provide a law library or other legal re-
sources to aid indigent inmates in the preparation of postconviction
legal documents. 142 Indeed, the right of meaningful access to the
courts is, to a large extent, concerned "with original actions seeking
new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental
civil rights.' 1 43
Second, Bounds did not dictate that states must establish libraries in
their prisons. Adequate law libraries "are one constitutionally accept-
able method to assure meaningful access to the courts." 1" Bounds
"does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal.' 1 45 The
Court encouraged local experimentation, but cautioned that any plan
"must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with consti-
tutional standards."' 146
D. Application of Bounds
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds, the Seventh Circuit
had proclaimed that "[c]itation of authority is hardly needed for the
proposition that an inmate's right of unfettered access to the courts is
as fundamental a right as any other he may hold .... All other rights
of an inmate are illusory without it." 147 Bolstered by Bounds and em-
powered with broad remedial discretion,4 8 federal courts have offered
141. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828 n.17.
142. The Court rejected North Carolina's claim that inmates are "ill-equipped to use the
tools of the trade of the legal profession," making libraries useless in assuring meaningful ac-
cess. Id. at 826. In fact, the Court noted that inmates are capable of using law books and re-
ferred to a law library or other legal assistance as "vital" for framing legal documents. Id. at
825-26.
143. Id. at 827.
144. Id. at 830.
145. Id. The Court listed examples of what these other means might be:
Among the alternatives are the training of inmates as paralegal assistants to work
under lawyers' supervision, the use of paraprofessionals and law students, either as
volunteers or in formal clinical programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys
through bar associations or other groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consult-
ant basis, and the use of full-time staff attorneys ....
Id. at 831.
146. Id. at 832.
147. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973).
148. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Supreme Court held that when prisoners'
constitutional rights were violated, and states failed to correct those violations, judicial authority
could be invoked. "Once invoked, 'the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."' Id. at 687
n.9 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)); see also
Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 734 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
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a panoply of measures designed to ensure that inmates are not denied
their right of meaningful access to the courts.
Meaningful access to the courts could be guaranteed, according to
Bounds, through a wide variety of programs. Whether a plan satisfies
the Bounds mandate requires an evaluation of that particular plan.149
The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
articulated a standard for determining whether an inmate is afforded
meaningful access:
[T]o a greater or lesser degree, dependent upon the circumstances of
a particular prison setting, it has been held that all permissible
programs must affirmatively include at least three aspects to meet the
Bounds standard. First, some source of legal information of a
professional nature must be available to all inmates for the full legal
development of their claims. This may consist of an adequate law
library available to all inmates or qualified attorneys in sufficient
number, or some combination of both. Secondly, for those inmates
who possess insufficient intellectual or educational abilities to permit
reasonable comprehension of their legal claims, provision must be
made to allow them to communicate with someone who, after
consultation with the legal learning source, is capable of translating
their complaints into an understandable presentation. Such a
presentation does not have to be refined, but it must be reasonable,
straightforward, and an intelligible statement. This goal may be
accomplished for the unlearned inmate through an institutional
attorney, a free-world person with paralegal training, or an inmate,
who through experience and intelligence, is a competent "writ-
writer." Where these sources of assistance are present, and no
physical or coercive restraints to prisoner complaints exist, due
process mandating access to the courts is met. 50
Courts have found a denial of meaningful access in a variety of sit-
uations, and have offered equally variant remedies to cure the viola-
tions. 5' Federal courts "using the alternatives set out in Bounds must
fashion a remedy which, under the circumstances found in a particu-
lar case, will provide meaningful relief."1'5 2 Courts have found viola-
tions of the meaningful access right articulated in Bounds when prison
149. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832.
150. Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106, 111 (W.D. Ky. 1983); see also Kendrick v.
Bland, 586 F. Supp. 1536, 1549 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
151. States bear the burden of proving that inmates are provided meaningful access to the
courts. Cody v. Hillard, 599 F. Supp. 1025, 1060 (D.S.D. 1984), aff'd, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.
1986), modified, 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988); Ken-
drick, 586 F. Supp. at 1548.
152. Battle, 457 F. Supp. at 737.
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law libraries lack necessary legal materials or publications. 53 More-
over, courts have uniformly found a denial of prisoners' meaningful
access rights when the prisoners have been denied reasonable physical
access to prison law libraries. 5 4 In these situations, courts typically
order prisons to purchase new materials and enjoin prison officials
from restricting the inmates' physical access to a law library.'55
Bounds held that the right of meaningful access required states to
provide prisoners with "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law."' 5 6 Interpreting "adequate assis-
tance" has been problematic. Courts have disagreed as to what
Bounds actually required. Most courts have construed Bounds to re-
quire other forms of legal assistance, in addition to a library, if more
than a library is needed to guarantee meaningful access. 17 Recogniz-
ing that a law library is "useless to those who are functionally illiter-
ate,"' 58 most courts have rejected the contention that prisons are
required to provide either a library or qualified legal assistance, but
not both. 159
A minority of courts have held that if a state provides inmates access to
an adequate law library, it need not provide access to trained lawyers. '6
153. See, e.g., Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 720 (5th Cir. 1980); Kendrick, 586 F. Supp. at
1551; Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 682 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1979).
For a discussion of the sufficiency of a law library under Bounds, see Comment, An Overview of
Prisoners' Rights: Part I, Access to the Court Under Section 1983, 14 ST. M~AY's L.J. 957, 971-
74 & n.97 (1983); see also Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541, 544 n.2 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430
U.S. 817 (1977).
154. See, e.g., Cruz, 627 F.2d at 720; Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979); Knop v. Johnson, 655 F. Supp. 871, 881 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
155. For example, in Battle, 457 F. Supp. at 739, the court ordered the establishment of a
new library and ordered the prison to establish a new policy affording inmates greater access to
legal materials.
156. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (emphasis added).
157. "Most recent case law interpreting the scope of Bounds establishes that a law library,
without more, is not sufficient to enable prison inmates, most of whom are unschooled in the
basics of legal research and legal writing, 'to prepare a petition or complaint."' Cody v. Hillard,
599 F. Supp. 1025, 1061 (D.S.D. 1984) (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828 n.17), aff'd, 799 F.2d
447 (8th Cir. 1986), modified, 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906
(1988).
158. Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp. 259, 291 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
159. See, e.g., Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F.
Supp. 1075, 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (stating that "Defendants' positions that they are obligated
only to provide either an adequate law library or qualified legal assistance is too narrow a read-
ing of Bounds") (emphasis in original); Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(Spanish-speaking inmates or those unable to comprehend legal reference materials "have a con-
stitutional right to legal assistance"), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1979).
160. See, e.g., Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800 (D.N.J. 1982). The Falzerano Court
adhered to this narrow view even though it believed "access to the fullest law library anywhere is
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In Hooks v. Wainright,'61 the Eleventh Circuit adopted this position
and rejected the contention that Bounds "intended there would be a
constitutional right to legal counsel, if it were found that some prison-
ers were illiterate and that nonlawyer prisoners could not use the li-
braries as well as lawyers.' ' 62 The court held that states are not
"constitutionally required to provide attorneys in order to furnish in-
mates with meaningful access to the courts. ' ' 63 This holding does not
mean that once a prison provides a law library it need do nothing
further in every case; meaningful access will sometimes require more
than access to a library.164
Bounds demands that a law library provide meaningful access for
all inmates.' 65 If the library cannot provide this access, some other
"legal assistance" must be made available to assist inmates in the
preparation of legal documents. In ordering legal assistance in addi-
tion to libraries, federal courts have offered a wide range of solutions
to guarantee inmates access to the courts.
Some courts have found law libraries to be inadequate if staffed by
untrained librarians or persons lacking a legal background.'66 In Ken-
drick v. Bland,'67 the court ordered a prison to designate a staff mem-
ber "trained in the law and law library maintenance" to supervise the
prison's law library.' 6 Several courts have ordered prisons to provide
a legal research staff or a similar entity in addition to competent li-
brarians. In United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v.
Kane,'69 the court enjoined the prison from closing a legal assistance
clinic formed by inmates. Legal assistance of this nature, in addition
a useless and meaningless gesture in terms of the great mass of prisoners." Id. at 803. "Access to
full law libraries makes about as much sense as furnishing medical services through books like:
'Brain Surgery Self-Taught,' or 'How to Remove Your Own Appendix,' along with scalpels,
drills, hemostats, sponges, and sutures." Id.
161. 775 F.2d 1433 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986).
162. Id. at 1436.
163. Id. at 1437.
164. At least one court has recognized this limitation: "Hooks does not stand for the propo-
sition that an adequate law library provides functionally illiterate inmates with meaningful access
to the courts." United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F. Supp. 1099,
1106 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 835 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Zimmerman v. Para-
Professional Law Clinic, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
165. Straub v. Monge, 815 F.2d 1467, 1470 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 946 (1987);
Kendrick v. Bland, 586 F. Supp. 1536, 1552 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
166. See, e.g., Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 720-21 (5th Cir. 1980); Wade v. Kane, 448 F.
Supp. 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1979).
167. 586 F. Supp. 1536 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
168. Id. at 1555.
169. 656 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 835 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom.
Zimmerman v. Para-Professional Law Clinic, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
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to a library, was essential to "assure all prisoners meaningful access to
the courts." 70
Courts have also ordered prisons to educate some inmates so that
they can assist other inmates in the preparation of legal documents.17'
Courts can order prisons to hire staff attorneys to assist inmates. " '
Finally, courts can require prisons to set up grievance procedures for
inmates who believe they have been denied meaningful access to the
courts. 171
Pursuant to Bounds, federal courts have provided many forms of
relief to inmates who have been denied the right of meaningful access
to the courts. Rarely, however, has a court held that Bounds required
the appointment of personal counsel to indigent defendants denied
meaningful access to the courts. 74 Whether a federal court may re-
quire a state to appoint counsel to assure meaningful access is the
question addressed in Murray v. Giarratano.71
II. MURRAY V. GIARRATANO
In Murray v. Giarratano,176 the Supreme Court, for the first time
since Bounds, addressed the scope of the right of meaningful access.
The Court was asked whether a district court, in order to remedy a
meaningful access violation, could order a state to provide an indigent
death row inmate with a personal attorney.
A. The Prisoners' Claim
Joseph M. Giarratano filed a pro se complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. 77 The district court permitted other death row
170. Id. at 1108 (emphasis in original).
171. See, e.g., Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951, 956 (3d Cir, 1988); Kendrick, 586 F. Supp
at 1555; Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1097 (E.D. Mich, 1979).
172. See, e.g., Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106, 108 (W.D. Ky. 1983).
173. See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp. 259, 296 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
174. For an example of a holding that counsel is constitutionally required, see Gibson v.
Jackson, 443 F. Supp. 239, 250 (M.D. Ga. 1977), vacated on abstention grounds, 578 F.2d 1045
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119 (1979).
175. 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
176. Id.
177. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 512 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd in part, 836 F.2d
1421 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cit. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
Giarratano was convicted of murdering a Virginia woman and raping and murdering her fifteen-
year-old daughter. He was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld both the
conviction and sentence. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94 (1980).
Giarratano confessed twice to the crimes, but has since recanted his confessions. He executed
an affidavit in 1988 in which he stated the following: "IS]imply put, I do not know whether I
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inmates to intervene and eventually certified a class comprised of all
current and future indigent inmates awaiting execution in Virginia.' 8
The plaintiffs maintained that "Virginia [was] constitutionally re-
quired to provide them with counsel in post-conviction proceedings
such as petitions for writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court or habeas corpus.' ' 79 The class asserted that the constitutional
right of meaningful access to the courts requires Virginia to appoint
"each indigent death row inmate competent and adequately paid
counsel to represent him in connection with post-conviction proceed-
ings.' 80
B. Virginia Law
Virginia provides for a mandatory direct appeal to the Virginia Su-
preme Court for all capital convictions and death sentences.', The
state provides counsel to all indigent defendants for this mandatory
appeal.'8 2 If the Virginia Supreme Court affirms the conviction and
sentence, execution may take place at any time, provided thirty days
have elapsed since the sentencing date.183 Generally, a stay of execu-
tion may be obtained to enable a prisoner to petition a state court for
a writ of habeas corpus.'8 4 Virginia does not, however, provide coun-
sel to indigent inmates seeking postconviction relief.
In Virginia, if a petition for a writ of habeas corpus omits any alle-
gation that could have been asserted, the petitioner may be forever
murdered [the victims] or not. Since the night I woke up in their apartment I have always as-
sumed, convinced myself, that I was guilty; but, I have never had any actual memory of commit-
ting the murders." Giarratano v, Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485-86 (4th Cir. 1989). The Fourth
Circuit has rejected a separate habeas corpus petition brought by Giarratano in which he
claimed, based in part on doubts about his guilt, "that he lacked the capacity to provide infor-
mation to counsel that was necessary to construct his defense." Id. at 486.
178. Glarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 512.
179. Id. Plaintiffs requested personal attorneys in both state and federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. Id. at 516. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia was not
required to appoint counsel for federal habeas corpus proceedings. See id. at 517; Giarratano v.
Murray, 836 F.2d 1421, 1427 (4th Cir. 1988); Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1122 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc). This issue was not considered by the Supreme Court and is not addressed in
this Note.
180. Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421, 1422 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989). The plaintiffs also advanced theories under
the eighth amendment, the equal protection clause, the due process clause, the sixth amendment
and article I of the Constitution. The district court expressed "serious doubts as to the viability
of many of these theories." Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 512.
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1(A) (1988). The death penalty is imposed in Virginia only in
cases of aggravated murder. Id. § 18.2-31. The state provides for comparative proportionality
review of death sentences. Id. § 17-110.1(C)(2).
182. Id. § 19.2-326 (Supp. 1989).
183. Id. § 53.1-232 (1988).
184. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 513.
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barred from raising those allegations in subsequent state proceed-
ings. '8 Omitted allegations may also be barred in future federal court
proceedings under the doctrine of procedural default.8 6 Thus, "the
state post-conviction petition is often the most critical single docu-
ment in the capital litigation."'8 7
If an indigent death row inmate wishes to pursue postconviction
claims, counsel may be appointed under one of two statutes. One pro-
vision authorizes the appointment of attorneys to each institution
housing indigent prisoners."8 8 The second provision authorizes courts
to assign counsel to indigent defendants under certain circum-
stances.'8 9 However, appointment of counsel is made only after the
petition for a writ is filed and the court determines the petition raises
a nonfrivolous claim and "presents a triable issue of fact."'19
C. The District Court Decision
Although the plaintiffs asserted several grounds in support of their
claim of entitlement to postconviction assistance of counsel, the dis-
trict court limited its consideration to the right of meaningful ac-
cess. 191 Finding many of the theories advanced by the plaintiffs to be
dubious, the court nevertheless found that "Bounds dictates that the
plaintiffs here be granted some form of relief." 92
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (1984); see also Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205
S.E. 2d 680 (1974) (holding that issues not raised at trial or on appeal may not be raised for the
first time in a state habeas corpus proceeding, absent a showing of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel), cert. denied sub nom. Parrigan v. Paderick, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975).
186. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).
187. Brief for Respondents at 8, Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411)
(quoting John C. Boger, plaintiffs' expert witness).
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40 (1988). This section provides:
The judge of a circuit court in whose county or city a state correctional facility is
located shall, on motion of the Commonwealth's attorney for such county or city,
when he is requested so to do by the superintendent or warden of a state correctional
facility, appoint one or more discreet and competent attorneys-at-law to counsel and
assist indigent prisoners therein confined regarding any legal matter relating to their
incarceration.
189. Id. § 14.1-183 (1989). This section provides:
Any person, who is a resident of this Commonwealth, who, on account of his poverty
is unable to pay fees or costs may be allowed by a court to sue or defend a suit
therein, without paying fees or costs; whereupon he shall have, from any counsel
whom the court may assign him, and from all officers, all needful services and proc-
ess, without any fees to them therefor, except what may be included in the costs recov-
ered from the opposite party.
190. Darnell v. Peyton, 208 Va. 675, 678, 160 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1968).
191. Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 512 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd in part, 836 F.2d
1421 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
192. Id.
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The district court began its consideration by discussing Bounds v.
Smith.' 93 Noting the obvious importance placed upon the concept of
meaningful access, the court stressed that the Supreme Court had held
that 'law libraries or other forms of legal assistance are needed to
give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed
violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."' 94 The
district court also noted that the Supreme Court based its decision
upon a key assumption: that inmates are capable of using law librar-
ies. 9 In Bounds, the Supreme Court stated that "this Court's experi-
ence indicates that pro se petitioners are capable of using law books to
file cases raising claims that are serious and legitimate."' 196 As the dis-
trict court observed, "[t]his assumption provided the basis for the al-
ternative nature of the required relief: trained legal assistance or
adequate law libraries."'' 97 The district court concluded, as a finding
of fact determined after the presentation of evidence at trial, that the
assumption upon which Bounds was decided was "invalid with respect
to death row prisoners in Virginia."' 9 8
Three factors led the court to conclude that Virginia's death row
inmates were incapable of effectively utilizing a law library. First, Vir-
ginia's death penalty scheme provides little time to prepare and pre-
sent a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, "a large amount of
legal work must be compressed into a limited amount of time."' 199 The
court found "beyond cavil that a prisoner unversed in the law and
methods of legal research would need much more time than a trained
lawyer to explore his case." 200
Second, preparation of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
complex and difficult. The court found the difficulties exacerbated by
Virginia's bifurcated capital trial proceedings, requiring a detailed
analysis of both the guilt determination phase and the sentencing
phase of a capital case. 20'
Third, an inmate sentenced to death is inherently incapable of ef-
fectively using a law library. The court found that "an inmate prepar-
ing himself and his family for impending death is incapable of
193. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
194. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 513 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825).
195. Id.
196. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826.
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performing the mental functions necessary to adequately pursue his
claim's."'202
Supported by these three considerations, the district court held that
Virginia's death row inmates "are incapable of effectively using law-
books to raise their claims. 20 3 Accordingly, Virginia's provision of
prison law libraries failed to satisfy the standards enumerated in
Bounds.20 4 Thus, the court concluded "Virginia must fulfill its duty by
providing these inmates trained legal assistance."°20  The court next ex-
amined Virginia's provision of "legal assistance" to its death row in-
mates.
The district court first held that Virginia's institutional att6rneys
failed to provide adequate legal assistance, thereby denying the death
row inmates meaningful access to the courts. 206 The court concluded
that Virginia's seven institutional attorneys, hired on a part-time ba-
sis, attempting to assist two thousand inmates, could not possibly ade-
202. Id.
203. Id. Several observers have noted that the majority of death row inmates are totally or
functionally illiterate, uneducated, mentally ill, or mentally retarded. See, e.g., Brief of the Mar-
yland State Bar Association, State Bar of Michigan, North Carolina State Bar, South Carolina
Bar Association, West Virginia State Bar as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15-22,
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411); Blume, Representing the Mentally
Retarded Defendant, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1987, at 32; Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 414, 479-84 (1985); Mello, Facing Death Alone:
The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 513, 548-52 (1988). In a
Florida case, a district court was presented with evidence showing that over half of that state's
inmates were functionally illiterate. See Hooks v. Wainright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (M.D. Fla.
1982), rev'd, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986).
Even the State of Virginia has recognized the difficulties faced by an inmate in presenting legal
claims. The state wrote the following as amicus curiae in support of the petitioners in Bounds v.
Smith:
The fact is inescapable that the average prison "writ writer" is, in spite of protesta-
tions to the contrary, uneducated, of borderline intelligence and often antagonistic
towards the legal system which he views as responsible for his present predicament.
The practice of law is at the least challenging and the interpretation of statutes, texts,
and judicial decisions are often the subject of intense disagreement between scholarly
and experienced counsel. . . . A law library in the hands of the average inmate is
virtually useless.
Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 8-9,
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (No. 75-915).
204. Virginia's death row inmates are incarcerated at three facilities. Although each facility
has a library, two forbid library visits; prisoners may only borrow materials for use in their cells.
The remaining facility permits death row inmates to visit the library twice weekly. Murray v.
Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2767 n.2 (1989).
205. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 513. The district court thus joined the majority of courts in
requiring both adequate law libraries and trained legal assistance to effectuate a prisoner's right
of meaningful access to the courts.
206. Id. at 514.
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quately assist the death row inmates. 20 7 Not one of the seven attorneys
had ever assisted a death row inmate in the preparation of a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. The institutional lawyers did not sign
pleadings, make court appearances, or "perform factual inquiries of
the kind necessitated by death penalty issues. ' 20 8 The court held that
Virginia's provision of institutional attorneys failed to provide the ad-
equate legal assistance required to afford death row inmates meaning-
ful access:
For death row inmates, more than the sporadic assistance of a
"talking law book" is required to enable them to file meaningful
legal papers. With respect to these plaintiffs, the Court concludes
that only the continuous services of an attorney to investigate,
research, and present claimed violations of fundamental rights
provides them the meaningful access to the courts guaranteed by the
Constitution. 209
The district court next determined that Virginia's system of ap-
pointed counsel also failed to satisfy the Bounds mandate. Noting that
counsel could not be appointed to indigent prisoners until a petition
raising nonfrivolous claims was filed, the court found that "the tim-
ing of the appointment [was] a fatal defect with respect to the require-
ments of Bounds. ' ' 21 0 The court recognized that because "an inmate
must already have filed his petition to have the matter of appointed
counsel considered, he would not receive the attorney's assistance in
the critical stages of developing his claims." 2"' Given Virginia's proce-
dural default rules, 22 the court noted that "the delay in receiving
comprehensive assistance of counsel . . . may be devastating. '2 13
The district court concluded that the constitutional requirements of
Bounds were not satisfied by the provision of prison law libraries or
institutional attorneys, or by the appointment of counsel to those in-
mates who file petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 2 4 Furthermore,
the district court found that the evidence "conclusively" established
that voluntary representation of death row inmates could not guaran-
207. Id. The evidence at trial demonstrated that each of the seven institutional attorneys
could not "adequately handle more than one capital case at a time." Id. At the time of the
district court decision, Virginia's death row housed 32 inmates. Id. at 512.
208. Id. at 514.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 515.
211. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 185-87.
213. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp at 515 n.2.
214. Id. at 515.
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tee an inmate meaningful access. 215 Thus, the court found relief both
"necessary and warranted" and ordered the state to "appoint counsel
to death row inmates who request such assistance before the petition is
filed. 2116
D. The Court of Appeals Panel Decision
By a majority vote, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit re-
versed,27 holding that "Virginia fulfills its obligation under Bounds to
provide all inmates with meaningful access to the courts, and there is
no factual or legal justification for requiring a higher standard of access
for death row inmates. 2 18 Rejecting a "sweeping extension of
Bounds," the panel found that the district court had, "under the guise
of meaningful access, established a right of counsel where none is re-
quired by the Constitution.' '219
The appellate panel found compelling the Supreme Court's decision
in Pennsylvania v. Finley.22° The court stated that it was "concerned
215. Id. The State of Virginia does not recruit attorneys to represent indigent death row
inmates on a pro bono basis. That function is performed exclusively by the private Virginia
Coalition on Jails and Prisons. The Coalition is a one-person operation: Marie Deans is its
founder, executive director and sole staff person. The Coalition is Virginia's only "system" of
legal assistance for prisoners condemned to die, a fact acknowledged by the state at trial. Ms.
Deans testified that it is becoming increasingly difficult to locate attorneys willing to represent
Virginia's death row inmates on a pro bono basis. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 1-5, Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411).
Virginia is not the only state experiencing a crisis in pro bono representation of prisoners
sentenced to death. The American Bar Association (ABA), in its amicus brief in Giarratano,
recognized that "due to the enormous complexity of state post-conviction capital proceedings,
attorneys have expended huge amounts of time and money and have become emotionally
drained." These enormous costs convinced the ABA "that it is, and will continue to be, impossi-
ble to find sufficient volunteer attorneys to handle these cases on a pro bono basis." Brief of
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Murray v. Giar-
ratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411); see also Blodgett, Death Row Inmates Can't Find
Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987, at 58; Godbold, Pro Bono Representation of Death Sentenced
Inmates, 42 REc. oF N.Y. CITY B.A. 859, 866 (1987); Wilson & Spangenberg, State Post-Convic-
tion Representation of Defendants Sentenced to Death, 72 JUDICATURE 331, 337 (1989).
216. Giarratano, 668 F. Supp. at 515. The relief was limited to state habeas corpus proceed-
ings. Federal law currently provides for the appointment of counsel in federal capital postconvic-
tion proceedings. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7001(q)(4)(B), 102
Stat. 4181, 4393-94.
217. Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421, 1428 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
218. Id. at 1423. The court recognized that it was bound by the district court's finding of
fact that Virginia violated its duty to provide death row inmates meaningful access to the courts,
but only if the finding was not "clearly erroneous." Thus, in order to reverse, the court deter-
mined that the district court "clearly erred" in concluding that a meaningful access violation had
occurred. Id.
219. Id.
220. 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Finley was decided after the district court's opinion. For a discus-
sion of Finley, see supra text accompanying notes 124-31.
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here with the identical type of proceeding addressed in Finley, state ha-
beas corpus, on the heels of a clear and recent statement of the Su-
preme Court that there is no previously established constitutional right
to counsel in state habeas corpus proceedings.' '22 1 Realizing that Finley
did not address a prisoner's right of meaningful access, the court was
quick to add that "[t]he rule of Bounds was not addressed in Finley
only because Bounds was not intended to imply a broad-based right of
counsel as the District Court here so interpreted it. "222 The court envi-
sioned the question before it as whether Virginia's indigent death row
inmates "constitute an exception to Finley, or justify an exceptional
application of Bounds."223
The Fourth Circuit panel rejected the contention that the difference
between the death penalty and lesser punishments required the relief
granted by the district court. The court observed that the "significant
constitutional difference" of the death penalty relates to sentencing
procedures.22 Thus, the court determined that the severity of the death
penalty was inapplicable to the meaningful access issue and stated that
the "'difference,' significant as it is, is not a basis upon which we may
begin implying a separate panoply of additional constitutional stan-
dards only applicable to collateral challenges in death penalty cases.' '225
To support its conclusion, the court discarded the district court's
findings of fact. The court found invalid all of the considerations which
led the district court to conclude that Virginia had denied its death row
inmates meaningful access to the courts. The appellate court did not
believe the record suggested the conclusion that the mental toll inherent
with a sentence of death could render a death row inmate incapable of
initiating postconviction proceedings. 226 The court also noted that the
record did not suggest the finding that a death penalty case is uniquely
complex. 227 Finally, the court found that the evidence did not establish
that the inmates were given a limited amount of time to file habeas
corpus petitions.22 The panel concluded that the district court's deter-
mination was clearly erroneous because Virginia had satisfied its consti-
tutional obligation to furnish its death row inmates with meaningful
221. Giarratano, 836 F.2d at 1424.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1425.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1426. The court noted that the district court's conclusion was refuted by the fact
that Giarratano himself had initiated several successful pro se lawsuits. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. The court again used Giarratano as an example: he had been on death row for seven
years. Id.
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access to the courts.229 Virginia was not, therefore, required to appoint
counsel upon request to assist in the preparation of state habeas corpus
petitions .230
E. The Court of Appeals En Banc Decision
A majority of the Fourth Circuit voted to hear the case en banc and,
upon reconsideration, affirmed the district court's judgment.2 31 The en
banc court rejected the two principle arguments advanced by the state.
Virginia first asserted that "the constitutional right of access to the
courts does not require appointment of counsel for death row inmates
in state habeas corpus proceedings and that Virginia provides consti-
tutionally adequate legal assistance to death row inmates. 232 The
court rejected this assertion and held that "the legal assistance pres-
ently available to Virginia death row inmates in state post-conviction
proceedings fails to meet the constitutional requirement of meaningful
access to the courts as set forth in Bounds. "233
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Virginia's contention that Finley,
not Bounds, should guide the court's determination.2 4 Arguing that
under Finley there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings, the state claimed that the indigent death row
inmates were not entitled to personal counsel to ensure their right of
meaningful access. The court found the state's reliance upon Finley
"misplaced, ' 235 and distinguished it by observing that "Finley was
not a meaningful access case, nor did it address the rule enunciated in
Bounds v. Smith. Most significantly, Finley did not involve the death
penalty. "236
The en banc court noted that 'there is a significant constitutional
difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments.' 237
229. Id. at 1423.
230. Id. at 1428.
231. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2765
(1989).
232. Id. at 1121.
233. Id. Because the determination that Virginia denied its death row inmates their constitu-
tional right of meaningful access to the courts was a finding of fact, the court applied the
"clearly erroneous" standard set forth in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564
(1985). Not only did the court hold that the findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the court
found no abuse of discretion in ordering, as a remedy, the appointment of personal counsel.
Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1121.
234. Giarratano, 847 F.2d at 1121.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1122.
237. Id. (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980)).
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Finding this difference to be compelling, 28 a majority of the Fourth
Circuit refused to "read Finley as suggesting that the counsel cannot
be required under the unique circumstances of post-conviction pro-
ceedings involving a challenge to the death penalty. ' 239 Concluding
that Virginia did not provide its death row inmates with meaningful
access to the courts, the court reinstated the district court's order.
Death row inmates, upon request, would be appointed a personal at-
torney to enable them to effectively petition state courts for a writ of
habeas corpus. 240
F. The Supreme Court Decision
In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Su-
preme Court reversed.2 4' The Court found Finley indistinguishable
from the case before it and reaffirmed that "neither the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the equal protection guar-
antee of 'meaningful access"' required states to "appoint counsel for
indigent prisoners seeking state postconviction relief.' '42
The Court placed no significance on the fact that Finley was not a
death penalty case. The Court observed that the severity of the death
penalty was traditionally a factor considered only when examining the
trial stage of a capital case. 243 Appellate review, on the other hand,
required no special standards when dealing with a capital convic-
tion. 244 The Court reasoned that if no special standards are required in
238. The court stated that "[b]ecause of the peculiar nature of the death penalty, we find it
difficult to envision any situation in which appointed counsel would not be required in state
post-conviction proceedings when a prisoner under the sentence of death could not afford an
attorney." Id. at 1122 n.8.
239. Id. at 1122.
240. The court pointed out that an attorney's assistance is "particularly critical" in Virginia
because of the state's procedural bar rules. If a claim is procedurally barred in the state courts,
federal courts generally may not consider it in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at
1120 n.4 (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987)). For a short discussion of Virginia's procedural bar
rules, see supra text accompanying notes 185-87.
241. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2772 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
was joined by Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia.
242. Id. at 2769.
243. Id. at 2770.
244. Id. The Court cited several of its decisions regarding appellate review of capital convic-
tions, including the following: Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (traditional appellate
standard of harmless error applies when reviewing claim of constitutional error in a capital case);
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (principles of procedural default in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings do not differ depending on severity of penalty); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984)
(proportionality review of death sentences not required); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887
(1983) ("direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence, and death
penalty cases are no exception"); see also Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (where five
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a capital case on appeal, it follows that no special standards are re-
quired in a collateral proceeding:
[T]he rule of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently in
capital cases than in noncapital cases. State collateral proceedings are
not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal
proceedings and serve a different and more limited purpose than
either the trial or appeal. The additional safeguards imposed by the
Eighth Amendment at the trial stage of a capital case are, we think,
sufficient to assure the reliability of the process by which the death
penalty is imposed. We therefore decline to read either the Eighth
Amendment or the Due Process Clause to require yet another
distinction between the rights of capital case defendants and those in
noncapital cases.2 45
The Court also disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's statement that
Finley did not address the right of meaningful access to the courts.2 46
Indeed, the Court perceived no "tension" at all between Bounds and
Finley. 47 The Court's holding in Finley was clear: "[P]risoners seek-
ing judicial relief from their sentence in state proceedings were not
entitled to counsel. 2 48 The right of meaningful access to the courts
could not be invoked as an exception to this hard-and-fast rule:2 49
"Finley applies to those inmates under sentence of death as well as to
other inmates, and that holding necessarily imposes limits on
Bounds. 25 0 Thus, Virginia was not required to appoint personal
counsel to an indigent death row inmate who had been denied mean-
ingful access to petition a state court for a writ of habeas corpus.2 11
Justices, in separate opinions, rejected the proposition that proceedings to determine sanity as a
predicate to execution are governed by the same heightened safeguards required in capital trials
and sentencings).
245. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2770-71 (footnote omitted).
246. Id. at 2771. The Court's disagreement was succinctly stated in one sentence: "Whether
the right of access at issue in Bounds is primarily one of due process or equal protection, in
either case it rests on a constitutional theory considered in Finley." Id. (footnote omitted).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. The Court remarked that "it would be a strange jurisprudence that permitted the exten-
sion of [Bounds] to partially overrule a subsequently decided case such as Finley" and that "[i]t
would be an even stranger jurisprudence to allow" such a partial overruling based upon a district
court's finding of fact. Id.
250. Id. at 2772.
251. Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy wrote concurring opinions. Justice O'Connor
agreed that the Constitution does not require a state to appoint counsel in a state postconviction
proceeding and stated that "[b]eyond the requirements of Bounds, the matter is one of legisla-
tive choice." Id. at 2772 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Simply put, states could voluntarily pro-
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G. The Dissent
Four Justices dissented in an opinion written by Justice Stevens. 25 2
Justice Stevens maintained that the appropriate question before the
Court was "not whether there is an absolute 'right to counsel' in col-
lateral proceedings, but whether due process requires that these re-
spondents be appointed counsel in order to pursue legal remedies." '253
The dissent distinguished Finley and "accorded controlling impor-
tance" to Bounds.25 4
The dissent noted three "critical differences" between Finley and
Giarratano.211 First, Finley was not a death penalty case. The dissent
recognized "that 'the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment, however long. ' '2 5 6 The "unique nature of
the death penalty . . . enhances the importance of the appellate proc-
ess." '25 7 Justice Stevens offered telling proof of the critical difference
between the death penalty and lesser punishments:
Federal habeas courts granted relief in only 0.2507o to 70o of
noncapital cases in recent years; in striking contrast, the success rate
in capital cases ranged from 60% to 70%. Such a high incidence of
uncorrected error demonstrates that the meaningful appellate review
necessary in a capital case extends beyond the direct appellate
process. 25s
Clearly, postconviction proceedings are vitally more important to the
prisoner condemned to die.
Second, the dissenting Justices recognized the difference between
Virginia's postconviction proceedings and those at issue in Finley. Un-
like Pennsylvania law, Virginia law contemplated "that some claims
ordinarily heard on direct review will be relegated to postconviction
vide indigent inmates with counsel, but could not be obligated to do so by the federal courts.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, found no meaningful access violation. See id. at
2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Since no inmate on death row in Virginia had been
unable to obtain counsel for postconviction proceedings and since the state provided institutional
lawyers in its prisons, Justice Kennedy was satisfied that there was no constitutional violation
"[o]n the facts and record of this case." Id. Apparently, he viewed the district court's findings
of fact as clearly erroneous, although this was not explicitly stated. Justice Kennedy concurred in
the judgment but did not join Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion.
252. Id. at 2773 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined
Justice Stevens' dissent.
253. Id. at 2775-76.
254. Id. at 2773.
255. Id. at 2776.
256. Id. at 2777 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2778 (footnote omitted) (citing Mello, supra note 203, at 520-21).
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proceedings. 2 9 Thus, in Virginia, "postconviction proceedings are
key to meaningful appellate review of capital cases."260
Third, the dissent accorded the appropriate deference to the district
court's findings of fact and found compelling the special circum-
stances surrounding an inmate on Virginia's death row. Recognizing
the "extremely limited period" a death row inmate has to prepare a
postconviction petition, the complexity and difficulty of death penalty
litigation and the emotional burdens faced by a prisoner condemned
to death, the dissent understood that "the plight of the death row in-
mate constrains his ability to wage collateral attacks far more than
does the lot of the ordinary inmate considered in Finley."' 26'
According to the dissent, "[tihese three critical factors demonstrate
that there is a profound difference between capital postconviction liti-
gation and ordinary postconviction litigation in Virginia. 2 62 This dif-
ference "support[s] the conclusion that to obtain an adequate
opportunity to present their postconviction claims fairly, death row
inmates need greater assistance of counsel than Virginia affords
them."1 6 Furthermore, Virginia failed to assert any valid justification
for its refusal to provide counsel to its thirty-two death row in-
mates.264 Notwithstanding Finley, the four dissenting Justices believed
that "[s]imple fairness" required affirmance. 265
H. Analysis
The plurality opinion in Giarratano is narrowly drawn and its con-
clusion is very limited: states are not required to appoint personal
counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state postconviction relief, re-
gardless of the sentence imposed. 266 The Court weighed the fourteenth
259. Id. For example, Justice Stevens noted that until a state habeas corpus proceeding, de-
fendants in Virginia could not raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. Justice
Stevens also suggested that claims of prosecutorial misconduct often do not surface until a state
postconviction proceeding. See id. Additionally, because Virginia will not permit direct appellate
review of a claim not objected to contemporaneously at trial, many claims cannot be raised until
a postconviction proceeding. See id. at 2779.
260. Id. The dissent further stressed the importance of Virginia's postconviction provisions
by noting the Court's strict adherence to its procedural default rules. See id.
261. Id. at 2780.
262. Id. at 2781.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2782.
266. It should be emphasized, however, that only four Justices joined in the Rehnquist opin-
ion. Justice Kennedy did not join in the opinion, but did concur with the result. This has
prompted at least one author to state that the "four-justice plurality" opinion which maintained
that the Constitution does not require the appointment of counsel in state postconviction pro-
ceedings is not a holding. Tabak, Justices Send Mixed Signals in Capital Cases, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
21, 1989, at S9, S14.
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amendment right of meaningful access to the courts, as outlined in
Bounds, against the absence of a right to counsel when mounting col-
lateral attacks to criminal convictions, as outlined in Finley. The
Court decided that the rule of Finley trumps the rule of Bounds.267
As important as what the Court did, however, is what the Court did
not do. The Court did not diminish a prisoner's constitutional right of
meaningful access. Rather, the Court removed a single remedy from
the arsenal of remedies a federal court may use to redress a meaning-
ful access violation. Where, as in Virginia, prisoners are denied mean-
ingful access, a federal court may not order the appointment of
personal counsel. Other relief is not foreclosed, however. Indeed, the
Court did not hold that the plaintiffs had been provided meaningful
access to the courts. Rather, the Court vacated the district court's or-
der requiring the appointment of personal counsel, and remanded the
case to the district court to remedy the situation without enlarging the
holding of Bounds.2 6s
Regardless of these limitations, the reasoning of the Court in reach-
ing its conclusion is faulty. The plaintiffs never requested, nor did the
district court create, a right to counsel where none had existed before.
Admittedly, the practical result is the same, but the district court only
authorized the appointment of counsel to remedy Virginia's denial of
the constitutional right of meaningful access. Although Giarratano
was a meaningful access case, the Supreme Court treated it as a right-
to-counsel case. Nonetheless, the Court's previous decisions concern-
ing the right to counsel did not compel the result reached in Giarra-
tano.
The plurality relied heavily on the Court's decisions in Finley and
Ross v. Moffitt.269 Yet neither Finley nor Ross supports the plurality
opinion as each decision was based upon its unique circumstances. In
Ross, the Court stated that it did not believe "that a defendant in
respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North
Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint
counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court. ' 270 Similarly, in
Finley, the Court stated that "the equal protection guarantee of
267. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2772. This decision should surprise no one given Chief Justice
Rehnquist's professed belief that "[tihere is nothing in the United States Constitution which
requires that a convict serving a term of imprisonment in a state penal institution pursuant to a
final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction have a 'right of access' to the federal courts
in order to attack his sentence." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 837 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
268. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2772.
269. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
270. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
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'meaningful access' [was not] violated in this case."27 ' Only after de-
termining that the constitutional right of meaningful access had been
provided to the defendants in Ross and Finley did the Court rule that
they were not entitled to counsel.
The proceedings considered in Ross were quite different from those
considered in Giarratano. The plurality ignored this difference. In
Ross, the respondent requested the appointment of counsel to assist
him in seeking discretionary review in the North Carolina Supreme
Court. 272 As the Court in Ross was careful to point out, the North
Carolina Supreme Court's power of review is limited and can be in-
voked only under certain narrowly drawn circumstances:
We are fortified in this conclusion by our understanding of the
function served by discretionary review in the North Carolina
Supreme Court. The critical issue in that court, as we perceive it, is
not whether there has been "a correct adjudication of guilt" in every
individual case, . . . but rather whether "the subject matter of the
appeal has significant public interest," whether "the cause involves
legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the
State," or whether the decision below is in probable conflict with a
decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may deny
certiorari even though it believes that the decision of the Court of
Appeals was incorrect.273
This review is quite distinct from that given in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, such as that considered in Giarratano, which affords a de-
fendant the first opportunity to raise some constitutional claims, such
as ineffective assistance of counsel. This distinction, overlooked by
the plurality in Giarratano, was not overlooked by the Court in
Bounds, where the Court contrasted the discretionary review at issue
in Ross with the kind of review provided by habeas corpus:
[I]n this case, we are concerned in large part with original actions
seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of
fundamental civil rights. Rather than presenting claims that have
been passed on by two courts, they frequently raise heretofore
unlitigated issues. As this Court has "constantly emphasized,"
habeas corpus and civil rights actions are of "fundamental
importance ... in our constitutional scheme" because they directly
protect our most valued rights. . . . While applications for
271. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (emphasis added).
272. Ross, 417 U.S. at 603. For a discussion of Ross, see supra text accompanying notes 108-
23.
273. Id. at 615 (citation omitted).
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discretionary review need only apprise an appellate court of a case's
possible relevance to the development of the law, the prisoner
petitions here are the first line of defense against constitutional
violations. The need for new legal research or advice to make a
meaningful initial presentation to a trial court in such a case is far
greater than is required to file an adequate petition for discretionary
review.
274
The proceedings at issue in Giarratano were virtually identical to those
considered in Bounds.
The plurality also did not consider the factual differences between
Giarratano and Finley. In Finley, the respondent had been appointed
counsel under state law for her postconviction proceedings. 275 Thus,
she was not claiming that counsel must be appointed. Rather, her
claim was that the procedures delineated in Anders v. California276 be
followed when appointed counsel seeks to withdraw. 277 In other
words, she was not seeking the protection that appointed counsel af-
fords, but was seeking the further protection of the Anders proce-
dures. Indeed, after the respondent's initial appointed counsel was
permitted to withdraw and the postconviction petition dismissed, she
was appointed a different attorney to assist her in appealing that dis-
missal. 271 Unlike the Giarratano plaintiffs, the respondent in Finley
was provided with legal assistance throughout her postconviction pro-
ceedings.
The Giarratano plurality's reliance upon Ross and Finley is mis-
placed. Before Giarratano, the Court had never held that under no
circumstances could states be required to appoint personal counsel in
postconviction proceedings. The Court has extended Ross and Finley
beyond their rational underpinnings. Confronted with a denial of the
meaningful access right, the Court ignored the basis of its past deci-
sions and refused to require the appointment of counsel to cure the
recognized constitutional violation.
Perhaps most disturbing about the Giarratano decision is the
Court's treatment of the significance of the death penalty. The
Court's statement on this point deserves further consideration:
274. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
485 (1969); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)). This critical difference was brought
to the attention of the Court by the respondents in Giarratano. See Brief for Respondents at 29,
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411).
275. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553. For a discussion of Finley, see supra text accompanying notes
124-31.
276. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For a short discussion of Anders, see supra text accompanying
notes 105-07.
277. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553-54.
278. Id. at 553.
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[T]he rule of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently in
capital cases than in noncapital cases. State collateral proceedings are
not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal
proceedings and serve a different and more limited purpose than
either the trial or appeal. The additional safeguards imposed by the
Eighth Amendment at the trial stage of a capital case are, we think,
sufficient to assure the reliability of the process by which the death
penalty is imposed. We therefore decline to read either the Eighth
Amendment or the Due Process Clause to require yet another
distinction between the rights of capital case defendants and those in
noncapital cases.2 79
The dissent aptly demonstrated the fallacy of this statement.2 0 As
Justice Stevens pointed out, federal courts grant relief in sixty to sev-
enty percent of all habeas corpus proceedings in capital cases. 28 This
fact suggests that the "process by which the death penalty is im-
posed" is patently unreliable. The eighth amendment "safeguards"
imposed at the trial stage of a capital case are demonstrably ineffec-
tive and simply cannot ensure the "reliability" of a death sentence.
The Court's refusal to require "yet another distinction" between
the rights of capital and noncapital defendants is confusing. As the
plurality itself pointed out, the Court has never required greater pro-
cedural safeguards in capital appeals than it requires in noncapital ap-
peals.2 82 Carving out a special rule in Giarratano for capital
defendants would not have been "yet another distinction"; it would
have been the only one. Additionally, the Court gave unwarranted
short shrift to the right at issue-the right of meaningful access to the
courts-"one of, perhaps the, fundamental constitutional right."2 83
Holding that Virginia could, but was not required to, appoint coun-
sel in state postconviction proceedings, the Court noted that "Virginia
may quite sensibly decide to concentrate the resources it devotes to
providing attorneys for capital defendants at the trial and appellate
stages of a capital proceeding." 8 4 The Court reasoned that "[c]apable
279. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2770-71 (footnote omitted).
280. See id. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Id. The high rate of success in capital habeas corpus proceedings has been recognized by
several authorities. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 915 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Godbold, supra note 215, at 873; Mello, supra note 203, at 520-21.
282. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2770.
283. Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original).
284. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2771. Virginia's "concentration of resources" devoted to pro-
viding attorneys for capital defendants at the trial and appellate stages of a capital proceeding is
most unimpressive. A study of Virginia's system for the representation of indigent defendants
concluded that the fees authorized for court-appointed counsel in Virginia are "the lowest of any
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lawyering [at those stages] would mean fewer colorable claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel to be litigated on collateral attack. '285 Of
course, under Gideon v. Wainwright2 6 and Douglas v. California,27
Virginia has no choice in the matter; counsel must be appointed for
the trial and the first appeal. 28 The plurality, however, assumed that
increased funding necessarily results in increased lawyer effective-
ness. 2 9 The plurality's proposition is speculative at best. The theory
espoused is premised on a belief that increased funding will attract
more competent attorneys to represent indigent capital defendants. As
a consequence of increased representation by competent attorneys, the
plurality concludes that capital defendants will advance fewer claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings. The
plurality's logic is flawed-incompetent attorneys will be as attracted
to the greater monetary rewards as competent attorneys. Furthermore,
the plurality assumes that fewer claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in postconviction proceedings would evidence a higher level of
capable lawyering at the trial and appellate stages of a capital pro-
ceeding. One could more plausibly assume that any decrease in the
number of such claims would be due to the fact that indigent, illiterate
death row inmates would be unable to recognize or assert an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim in a postconviction proceeding without
the aid of an attorney.
The Court also failed to explain why it attached greater importance
to Finley than to Bounds.29° The Court refused to require Virginia to
appoint counsel to indigent death row inmates seeking postconviction
relief, but failed to examine critically Virginia's postconviction proc-
ess. Upon closer inspection, the dissent found Virginia's system to be
comparable state in the country." Abt Associates Inc., Analysis of Costs for Court-Appointed
Counsel in Virginia 1 (Apr. 1985, Cambridge, Mass.) [hereinafter Abt Associates Study] (in-
cluded as an exhibit in Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Giarratano v. Murray, 669 F. Supp.
511 (E.D. Va. 1986) (Civ. A. No. 85-0655-R) (motion filed Feb. 12, 1986)). A later study re-
vealed that one court-appointed attorney in Virginia was paid by the state at a rate of $.57 per
hour. See Wilson & Spangenberg, supra note 215, at 336.
285. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. at 2771.
286. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
287. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
288. For a discussion of Gideon and Douglas, see supra text accompanying notes 51-66.
289. No evidence or study is cited to support this proposition. However, the Court may be
correct. The Abt Associates Study warned that the "crisis in indigent defense funding" in Virgi-
nia placed judges "in the impossible position of being required to make appointments, but not
being able to secure a sufficient number of competent attorneys to meet the constitutional re-
quirements of 'effective assistance of counsel."' Abt Associates Study, supra note 284, at 54.
290. The Court does mention that Finley was decided after Bounds. See Giarratano, 109 S.
Ct. at 2771. Other than the timing of the two decisions, it is unclear why the Finley rule takes
precedence over the Bounds right of meaningful access.
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markedly different from the system of review at issue in Finley.29' The
plurality failed to address this distinction. Instead, the plurality simply
embraced the rule of Finley, and refused to "enlarge the holding of
Bounds. "292
Chief Justice Rehnquist once observed that "[i]f 'meaningful ac-
cess' to the courts is to include law libraries, there is no convincing
reason why it should not also include lawyers appointed at the expense
of the State. ' 293 In Giarratano, Chief Justice Rehnquist offered no
convincing reason to deny the appointment of personal counsel to an
indigent death row inmate denied meaningful access to the courts. Un-
der the rationale of the plurality, "a court could find that lawyers
were an appropriate Bounds remedy for illiterate prisoners who could
not otherwise bring civil rights actions, draft wills, or file divorce pa-
pers, but Finley would preclude this same court from finding that a
lawyer is necessary to obtain a stay of execution." 94
III. CONCLUSION
The kind of trial a death row inmate will receive in a state post-
conviction proceeding will now depend on the amount of money that
prisoner has. In Murray v. Giarratano, the Supreme Court delineated
a bright-line rule: states are not required to appoint counsel to indi-
gent defendants except at trial and the first appeal as of right. The
Court, therefore, limited the relief available to an indigent prisoner
deprived of the constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts.
Indigent prisoners will now be forced to seek other, possibly more
costly, remedies.
Federal courts are afforded broad discretion in fashioning equitable
remedies. When a state has deprived its inmates of their meaningful
access rights, a court may not order the offending state to appoint
personal counsel, but the court could require the state to cure the con-
stitutional defect in a variety of other ways. For example, the state
could be required to increase the volume and quality of legal materials
contained in its prison libraries, increase the size of the library staff,
implement legal education programs for its inmates, afford greater
physical access to the libraries and materials, or afford a much greater
amount of time in which to allow indigent, and often illiterate, in-
mates to prepare their habeas corpus petitions. Virginia could be re-
291. Id. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 2772.
293. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 841 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
294. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26-27 n.12, Murray v. Giarra-
tano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (No. 88-411).
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quired to employ additional institutional attorneys on a full-time
basis. Giarratano rejected only the remedy of appointment of per-
sonal counsel. Finally, a court may stay an execution indefinitely if a
particular inmate's meaningful access rights cannot be guaranteed by
any means other than the appointment of personal counsel.2 95
On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia will decide how Virginia will provide its death row inmates
with meaningful access to the courts. Virginia may not be required to
appoint counsel for postconviction proceedings, but it should not be
allowed to deprive these inmates of their constitutional right of mean-
ingful access to the courts.
295. The refusal of the Supreme Court of Florida to vacate the stays of execution of two
death row inmates until those inmates were provided with postconviction counsel provided part
of the impetus for the creation of Florida's Office of Capital Collateral Representative. Mello,
supra note 203, at 600-01 (citing State v. Green, 466 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985) (summary denial of
writ of prohibition); State v. Beach, 466 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985) (summary denial of writ of
prohibition)). This office is responsible for representing all indigent death row inmates in Florida
who are without counsel in postconviction proceedings. FLA. STAT. § 27.702 (1987). Florida's
response to the postconviction attorney crisis is thoroughly analyzed in Professor Mello's article.
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